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Global Transmission of Interest Rates:
Monetary Independence and Currency Regime
Introduction
Changes in interest rates in major countries tend to have important effects on other countries. For example, as has also been true in past episodes of global monetary tightening, the 1999-2000 hikes in U.S. interest rates were rapidly reflected in interest rate increases in other industrial and developing economies. In emerging markets, the increases were in several cases proportionally larger than those experienced in the U.S., presumably because country and/or currency risks increased after the Fed decided to tighten U.S. monetary policy. Even though the pressure to increase interest rates was felt virtually across the board, one question remains unanswered: are countries with flexible exchange rates more able to isolate their domestic interest rates from this type of negative international shock? This issue of monetary independence, which lies at the heart of the debate on currency arrangements, is the central question of this paper.
The choice of exchange rate regime -floating, fixed, or somewhere in betweenhas been a recurrent question in international monetary economics. According to the conventional view, the two major advantages of fixing the exchange rate are: (1) reduced transactions costs and exchange rate risk, that can discourage trade and investment, and (2) a credible nominal anchor for monetary policy.
The advantages of a flexible exchange rate, on the other hand, can generally be described under one major property: it allows the country to pursue independent 2 monetary policy. 1 The argument in favor of monetary independence, instead of constraining monetary policy by the fixed exchange rate, is the classic argument for discretion instead of rules. When the economy is hit by a disturbance, such as a shift in worldwide demand away from the goods it produces, the government would like to be able to respond, so that the country does not go into recession. Under fixed exchange rates, monetary policy is always diverted, at least to some extent, to dealing with the balance of payments. Under the combination of fixed exchange rates and complete integration of financial markets, which characterizes the European monetary union, monetary policy becomes completely powerless.
2 By freeing up the currency, on the other hand, the country can respond to a recession by means of monetary expansion and depreciation of the currency. This stimulates demand for domestic products and returns the economy to desired levels of employment and output, more rapidly than would be the case under the automatic mechanisms of adjustment on which a fixed-rate country must rely.
3 rate should be less sensitive to changes in international interest rates -other things equal.
Countries with intermediate regimes should also display less sensitivity to international interest rates than countries with firm pegs.
Despite these predictions, an alternative view -stated, among others, by Reinhart (2001 and and Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (2001) -holds that there exists "fear of floating," that prevents countries with de jure flexible regimes from allowing their exchange rates to move freely. According to this view, factors like lack of credibility, exchange rate pass-through, and foreign-currency liabilities prevent countries from pursuing an independent monetary policy, regardless of their announced regime.
Therefore, many countries, even if formally floating, are de facto "importing" the monetary policy of major-currency countries, much as those with pegs. It has even been suggested that interest rates might sometimes be more sensitive to U.S. rates in flexiblerate developing countries than in fixed-rate countries, because flexible-rate developing countries suffer from having to pay risk premia (both currency premia to compensate for devaluation risk and country premia to compensate for default risk) and because these premia may be sensitive to world interest rates.
Although monetary independence has been at the heart of the debate on exchange rate regimes, empirical evidence on the issue is still scarce. In particular, there are few empirical studies on whether floating exchange rate regimes do indeed allow independent monetary policy, in the sense that interest rates in countries with floating regimes are less sensitive to foreign interest rates. Focusing on some countries whose regimes can be clearly defined as either currency boards or floating regimes (such as those in Argentina, Mexico, Hong Kong, and Singapore), Borensztein, Zettlemeyer, and Philippon (2001) 4 find some evidence consistent with the traditional view. This study is particularly interesting because it makes a particular effort to identify the response of interest rates to exogenous shocks in world interest rates. On the other hand, selected country evidence during the 1990s -reported in Frankel (1999) and Hausmann, Gavin, Pages, and Stein (1999) -is consistent with the alternative view.
The goal of this paper is to establish major empirical regularities concerning the sensitivity of domestic interest rates to international interest rates under different currency regimes.
To do this, we analyze the widest possible spectrum of regimes, from full exchange rate flexibility to currency boards. Thus, the paper should help place the ongoing debate in the context of the observed facts, and allow an assessment of the competing claims cited above on the relative merits of alternative exchange rate arrangements from the perspective of monetary independence.
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The paper extends the empirical literature in several directions. First, while previous studies have been limited to a handful of countries over short time periods, here we consider a much larger data set in both the cross-country and time-series dimensions,
by working with a sample of industrial and developing countries over the last three decades. Second, we study both the long-run transmission of interest rates and their dynamic adjustment under different exchange rate regimes. Third, we test the robustness of the results to changes in sample period, empirical specification, and exchange rate regime classification system. Finally, even though we work mainly with U.S. rates as our primary indicator of "foreign interest rates," we also take into account the emergence in 4 There is an extensive empirical literature that studies the merits of different exchange rate regimes in other dimensions. For example, Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, and Wolf (1996) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the methodology and data used in this paper. Section 3 presents pooled estimation results by exchange rate regime, income group, and decade. Section 4 presents individual-country dynamic estimates for the 1990s. Section 5 summarizes the results and concludes. The
Appendix describes the exchange rate regimes in each country in the sample.
Methodology and Data
Methodology
In principle, there are several factors that determine the extent to which domestic and foreign interest rates move together. The first one is the degree of financial integration of the domestic economy into world markets. Barriers to international capital flows can dampen the response of local rates to changes in international rates, allowing monetary authorities in different countries to maintain different interest rate levels for extended periods, even under fixed exchange rates. Second, the degree of real international integration also affects the comovement of domestic and foreign interest rates: if business cycles are highly synchronized across countries, domestic and foreign rates will tend to move closely together, given other things. Third, the nature of shocks also contributes to determine the degree of comovement. Unlike country-specific idiosyncratic shocks, common shocks -such as financial and climatic -affect many the international transmission of anticipated inflation under different exchange rate regimes. See Holman and Rioja (2001 Notwithstanding these considerations, our primary concern here is to establish the empirical regularities regarding the observed link between local and foreign interest rates, rather than sorting out the role of each of the above factors. Thus, our starting point is the empirical estimation of a simple reduced-form specification using panel data: represents the domestic nominal interest rate in local currency of country i at time t; f i is a country-specific effect; 5 * t r is the international interest rate; and X i,t is a set of control variables. We assume that the error term ε i,t has mean zero and is independently distributed across countries, but is possibly heteroskedastic and serially correlated.
In our basic panel specification we include no control variables (i.e., we drop X it from (1)). As a robustness check, however, we repeated our empirical experiments including as control variable the difference between the domestic and foreign inflation 7 rates. 6 We do this because much of the variation in nominal interest rates, across countries and over time, could just reflect variation in currency (and/or country) risk premia, both of which might be proxied by inflation differentials. 7 However, adding the inflation differential to our specification (1) causes virtually no change in the empirical estimates, and thus to save space we only report a subset of the inflation-inclusive experiments below.
As a further robustness check, we also added into X i,t a set of dummy variables to control for turbulent periods, when the sensitivity of local interest rates to foreign ones may differ from its "normal" value. Specifically, we used three dummies. The first one is a "crisis" dummy constructed along the lines of the literature on exchange rate crises.
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The second is a hyperinflation dummy, equal to one when monthly inflation is above 50 percent. Finally, the third is a "transition" dummy to control for changes in the exchange rate regime -specifically, exit from pegs to other regimes. 9 Further, to allow some additional flexibility in our specification we also interacted the three dummies with the 5 Note that time-specific effects cannot be included, because they would be perfectly collinear with * t r . 6 All interest rates and inflation rates z are defined as ln (1+z). We also experimented with a somewhat more general version including separately domestic and foreign inflation, rather than entering them as a differential. Results with this broader specification, however, showed that in general the differential specification was not rejected by the data.
8 foreign interest rate. On the whole, the empirical results obtained from these experiments were quite similar to those from the basic specification without controls, and hence to save space they are not reported below.
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We estimate equation (1) separately for each currency regime, since preliminary evidence showed that neither the country effects nor the coefficients on the control variables were equal across regimes. For each regime, we are interested in two parameters, characterizing respectively the sensitivity of the local interest rate to the foreign rate (β in equation (1) above), and the average level of the local interest rate (after controlling for the foreign interest rate). The latter can be summarized by a parameter α, defined as:
that is, the average of the country-specific effects under the regime in question.
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In section 3 we report pooled estimates of α and β obtained on the full sample, as well as grouping countries by per-capita income level and breaking the sample by decade (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s) , to see if there are any significant differences along these dimensions.
According to conventional wisdom, more flexible exchange rate regimes should allow countries additional room to pursue their independent monetary policy. Therefore, To assess the dynamics of interest rate adjustment, we employ a dynamic version of (1) including lags of the dependent and independent variables. Our starting point is 
This is just an unrestricted autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) model of order
. With some straightforward manipulations, it can be rewritten as
. (4) Equation (4) is written in error-correction form, with the "long-run" solution given by the term in square brackets in the right-hand side, analogous to (1) above. 13 The 12 In fact, this would be precisely the case in a panel cointegration context if domestic and foreign interest rates were non-stationary (but cointegrated); see Baltagi (2000) . 13 Note that a long-run equilibrium relation among the variables of interest may exist irrespective of whether they are I(0) or I(1); see Pesaran (1997) .
speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium is measured by the parameter Rather than pooling the data, we estimate the dynamic specification (4) separately for each country-currency regime episode in the sample. The reason is that even under cross-country regime homogeneity of the long-run parameters (e.g., full adjustment of local to foreign interest rates in the long run under every currency regime), heterogeneity in the adjustment dynamics may exist among countries with similar exchange rate regimes due to factors such as the degree of development of the financial system and the openness of the capital account. Pooled estimation of (4) would then yield inconsistent estimates (Pesaran and Smith 1995) .
Our approach to the estimation of (4) departs from the recent cointegration literature and thus does not require pre-testing for order-of-integration conformability.
14 Specifically, if the disturbance u t is serially uncorrelated (which basically requires sufficiently long lag orders P and/or Q) and at most one long-run relation exists among lc r , * r , and X, the speed of adjustment δ and the long-run parameters can be jointly estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), regardless of whether the variables are I(0) or
Moreover, in the framework of equation (4) 14 These pre-testing procedures face more often than not the problem of low power of standard unit root tests. In our case, a priori we would expect interest rates to be I(0) variables, as noted by Cochrane (1991) . However, this is inessential for our estimation procedure.
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In our basic dynamic specification, we let X equal the inflation differential but set
. In other words, we let the inflation differential affect the dynamic adjustment but not the long-run equilibrium, which is therefore analogous to equation (1) . In both cases, the results were virtually identical to those obtained with the basic specification, and hence to save space they are not reported below. 
Data
Our basic source of interest rate data is the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We work with monthly data on 90-day local money market rates for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. We choose money market interest rates because they reflect market forces better than deposit rates. The latter, while much more widely available, are often subject to administrative controls and in many cases display little movement over prolonged periods, which renders them uninformative for our purposes. 18 As international interest rate, we use the 90-day U.S. T-bill rate but, as we shall discuss below, for some experiments we use also the German 90-day T-bill rate.
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Our classification of exchange rate regimes is based on a quarterly database from the IMF which encompasses a total of ten regime categories, based on officially reported 17 These additional results are available upon request. 18 In a number of cases we found that the money market interest rate data from IFS were identical to the deposit data. In such cases, we discarded countries/periods for which rates showed no variation or infrequent step-wise movements. 19 We also experimented with the U.S. LIBOR dollar rate. The results were very similar, since the two rates are very highly correlated 14 exchange arrangements for the period 1975-1996. The Appendix lists the regimes prevailing in each country over the sample period according to this source. We present some empirical results (in Table 1 below) from estimating equation (1) using the detailed regime categories in the original source. However, to simplify the analysis, in the rest of our experiments we condense these categories into three broader exchange rate regimes:
fixed ( To assess the robustness of our results, we repeated our empirical estimations using two alternative classifications. The first one is that of Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) , who propose a de facto classification based on actual data on exchange rates and reserves, which is fairly different from the IMF-based one because the latter reflects de jure information supplied by domestic monetary authorities. Below we report a set of empirical results based on this alternative classification. The second alternative classification is that of Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, and Wolf (1996) . Results using this latter option were quite similar to those obtained using the IMF-based classification, so we do not report them to save space.
The rest of our data -exchange rates, inflation, and country indicators, such as population and income level on which the sample selection is based -come from the World Bank-IMF databases.
We focus on industrial economies and middle-income developing countries. and a total number of monthly observations exceeding 9,300.
Interest Rate Sensitivity: Pooled Estimates
We first assess empirically the sensitivity of domestic interest rates to international interest rates by estimating equation (1) using the entire sample, as well as distinguishing between industrial and developing countries and considering subsamples defined by time period. show a slope estimate similar to that of pegged regimes (0.60) and managed floats, whose slope coefficient is estimated imprecisely and is not significantly different from zero.
The estimated constants under each regime also deserve mention. As noted earlier, they could be viewed as reflecting the level of the domestic interest rate characteristic of each regime, after removing the effects of international interest rates.
The In spite of the simplicity of the specification and the fairly large sample sizes, our estimated equations capture a considerable amount of the observed variation in interest rates, as shown by the R 2 statistics in the table.
The above estimates pool for each regime all countries and time periods.
However, a closer look seems warranted, because the underlying data may conceal a considerable degree of heterogeneity along two major dimensions. First, the overall sample includes countries with very diverse degrees of economic and financial development. Specifically, industrial countries are financially more stable, and tend to possess stronger and more credible institutions than developing countries. These factors may allow them to pursue an independent monetary policy to a larger extent than developing economies.
Second, the long time span of the full sample may conceal significant variation over time in the sensitivity of domestic to foreign interest rates, as barriers to international capital movements have declined steadily over the last two decades.
Restrictions to capital movements were commonplace during the 1970s. In the 1980s, many countries, especially developed nations, started removing barriers to capital flows and liberalizing their financial systems. By the beginning of the 1990s, most developed and developing countries had already liberalized their financial sectors. 22 The increasing degree of financial liberalization likely enhanced the comovement of domestic and international interest rates, as shown in Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) .
A third, more specific issue concerns the evolution of monetary arrangements in most of Western Europe, which in the late 1980s and 1990s assigned to the DM the role of hegemonic currency. For the countries involved in the DM (now EMU) zone of influence, German interest rates likely provide a measure of international rates more relevant than the U.S. rates used in Table 1. 22 See Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) for a chronology of financial liberalization.
We address these issues in Tables 2 and 3, where we split the sample by income group, decade, and exchange rate regime. To keep the amount of information manageable, we proceed in the same fashion as Ghosh et al. (1999) and condense the various exchange rate regimes into the three broader categories shown in Table 1 In contrast, the slope estimates for the 1990s are considerably larger and more precise. For intermediate and floating regimes, the point estimates are close to unityalthough they still exhibit relatively large standard errors. For fixed regimes we obtain a much larger slope estimate (1.81), statistically greater than one at conventional significance levels, suggesting an over-adjustment of local interest rates. The results in Table 3 show that the fixed regimes of the 1970s exhibit full adjustment of local to international interest rates, while intermediate and floating regimes show less-than-full adjustment in the 1970s and 1980s. The slope point estimates of the former are somewhat larger than those of the latter, although the difference between both is fairly modest.
In the 1990s, three results emerge. First, interest rates in countries with intermediate regimes are wholly unaffected by U.S. interest rates. Second, once we take account of the leading role of Germany in the DM zone, we find that the interest rates of these countries show (more than) full adjustment to German rates. Third, interest rates in countries with floating regimes also exhibit full transmission of U.S. rates. These results suggest that as developed countries became more integrated in the 1990s, their interest rates became fully sensitive to the relevant international interest rates -which in the case of the EMU zone means the German rate rather than the U.S. rate.
We next perform two robustness checks on these results. First, we add the inflation differential as an explanatory variable. As already explained, much of the variation in interest rates might reflect variation in currency and country premia, both of which could be related to inflation differentials; omission of this factor might lead to an overstatement of the role of foreign interest rates in the determination of local rates. 21 Tables 4 and 5 present the results from these robustness checks for developing and industrial countries, respectively. To avoid cluttering the tables, we only report the slope coefficient estimates, omitting the estimated coefficients on the inflation differential when included in the specification. and a decline in the point estimate of fixed regimes in the 1990s, which remains greater than one although not significantly so. Indeed, in the latter decade all regimes now exhibit slope estimates insignificantly different from unity, although that for fixed regimes continues to be somewhat above the rest.
The last three columns of Table 4 present the results obtained with the LYS regime classification. The slope estimates for the 1970s and 1980s are even less precise than those in Table 2 , although numerically they are broadly similar. For the 1990s, the alternative classification yields somewhat lower slope estimates that the original one for fixed and intermediate regimes. The former still exhibit more-than-full interest rate adjustment (although the point estimate is not significantly greater than one), while the latter do not. Nevertheless, the slope estimate for intermediate regimes is higher in the 1990s than in the previous decades. The point estimate for floating regimes is similar, but less precise, than that obtained with the original classification, and it also suggests full interest rate adjustment. The last three columns of Table 5 show the results obtained using the LYS regime classification. For the 1970s, the slope estimates are broadly similar to those in Table 3: fixed regimes show an estimate slightly above one, while the other regimes show much smaller values that indicate only partial interest rate adjustment. However, the relative ranking of intermediate and floating regimes is reversed relative to that in Table 3 .
For the 1980s and 1990s, the alternative classification yields some fixed-regime observations, which were absent from In the 1990s the slope estimate for fixed regimes is negative and highly imprecise.
Under the LYS classification, this group turns out to consist of European countries in the DM-EMU zone, so the fact that we find no response of their local interest rates to U.S.
rates is quite consistent with the results in Table 3 above. For the other regimes, the estimates also show the same pattern as those in Table 3 . Thus, for intermediate regimes the estimate is insignificant when the role of the DM as leading currency in Europe is ignored, and slightly above one (although not significantly so) when such role is taken into account. For floating regimes, the slope estimate is somewhat smaller, but also slightly above one (and again not significantly so).
To summarize this section, when heterogeneity along the income level and time dimensions is ignored, the pooled estimates by exchange rate regime seem to lend modest support to the conventional wisdom that fixed exchange rate regimes show greater sensitivity of domestic to foreign interest rates than other regimes -although in general all regimes show less-than-full transmission. Further, fixed regimes also tend to exhibit lower average interest rates, for given levels of foreign interest rates.
A closer look at the results reveals considerable differences between industrial and developing countries and across time periods. Among developing countries it is difficult to draw any clear inferences for the 1970s and 1980s, given the poor precision of most point estimates. In the former decade, intermediate regimes appear to display the highest degree of adjustment, while in the latter this role seems to correspond to pegged regimes. In the 1990s, however, all developing-country regimes display full or near-full adjustment of local to foreign interest rates -although the point estimates are generally larger for fixed regimes (for which they even exceed unity) than for the rest.
Furthermore, these results are robust to the changes in specification and regime classification explored here. The only exception is the less-than-full adjustment found for intermediate regimes in the 1990s when using the alternative LYS classification.
As for industrial countries, our empirical experiments are generally more precise.
Using the IMF classification we find that in the 1970s and 1980s only pegged regimes 
Interest Rate Sensitivity: Dynamic Estimates
On the whole, the pooled estimates in the previous section suggest a convergence across regimes in the 1990s towards full transmission of foreign interest rates, for both industrial and developing countries.
Given the absence of dynamics in our estimated specification, this conclusion might be viewed as implying that no exchange rate arrangement prevents eventual adjustment of local interest rates to foreign ones -i.e., no regime offers permanent monetary autonomy. It may be argued that the relevant question concerns the degree of temporary autonomy that various regimes offer to the monetary authorities -as measured by the length of time it takes for local interest rates to fully reflect changes in foreign rates.
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To explore this issue, we turn to the dynamic specification (4). As already noted, we estimate it on an individual-country basis given that a priori cross-country heterogeneity in the dynamics could be considerable, depending on country-specific factors such as financial system development and capital account regulations. Further, we focus on the 1990s, when the convergence among regimes just noted is most apparent.
Finally, we focus on a few selected economies whose exchange rate regime can be The next block in Table 6 reports the results for intermediate regimes.
Here the estimated speeds of adjustment are much smaller than in the hard pegs, except perhaps for Thailand. The half life ranges from more than one month in Thailand to more than seven months in Chile. In the case of Singapore, the null of no long-run relation can be rejected only for I(0) variables -which we regard as the most likely scenario anyway.
The long-run slope estimates are statistically not different from one, although in the case of Chile the point estimate is close to three and quite imprecise. Thailand also shows a slope estimate above unity, although not significantly.
The last block in Table 6 reports the results for the three developing-country floating regimes. Their estimated speeds of adjustment, and the respective t-statistics, are lower than those found for pegged regimes -even lower than those for intermediate regimes.
The half life varies between more than four months in Mexico to more than eight months in the Philippines. On the other hand, the long-run slope estimates are all 27 well above unity, with that of Mexico implausibly high, likely reflecting the high degree of financial turbulence over the relatively short post-Tequila sample used here. Strictly speaking, however, none of the slope coefficients is significantly different from one.
On the whole, therefore, the individual developing country estimates in Table 6 suggest full long-run adjustment of interest rates under all regimes (with some indication of over-adjustment in a majority of cases), with a faster speed of adjustment under hard pegs than under the other regimes. range from a high of 0.47 in Portugal to a low of 0.05 in Spain, implying a half life between more than one month to more than 13 months. In the latter country the t-statistic fails to reject the null of no long-run relation, but the test is invalidated by the presence of serial correlation (as implied by the q-statistic). This might be due to the selection by the Akaike criterion of too short a dynamic specification, a problem that seems to affect also Belgium. Nevertheless, experiments imposing longer lag lengths led to similar parameter estimates. The long-run slope estimates for all these countries are above one, and significantly so in the cases of Denmark and Portugal.
The bottom half of Table 7 reports the results for six industrial-country floating regimes -three relatively small economies (Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) and three large ones (Germany, Japan, and the U.K.). The results reveal a sharp contrast between the two -more specifically, between Germany and Japan, on the one hand, and the Schwartz criterion instead of the Akaike criterion, led to broadly similar results.
the rest of the countries, on the other. For the smaller-country floating regimes, the speeds of adjustment are generally smaller than for the DM-zone countries. For New Zealand the estimate is also imprecise, so that formally we cannot reject the null of no long-run relation, 24 although like with Spain there is some mild indication of serial correlation that might invalidate the test. The point estimates of the long-run slope are all above unity -almost significantly so in the case of Australia. The U.K. shows a long-run slope estimate smaller than unity, although not significantly so, and its speed of adjustment is somewhat above those of the smaller economies.
For Germany and Japan, the situation is radically different. The speed of adjustment estimates are very close to, and insignificantly different from, zero.
Moreover, the estimates are quite precise. Imposing other lag specifications instead of the one selected by the Akaike criterion in Table 7 does not alter this result. Thus, for these two countries we cannot reject the null of no long-run relation between domestic and foreign interest rates at any reasonable confidence level. Since the estimated equations show no symptom of serial correlation, the result is not due to dynamic misspecification. Absent a long-run relation, the long-run slope estimates are meaningless and thus we omit them from the table.
Like with the pooled estimates, we examined the sensitivity of the results reported in this section to inclusion of the inflation differential in the long-run equilibrium 24 Inspection of the critical values of Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) shows that we can reject the null at the 10 percent level if the variables are I(0).
condition, and to exclusion of the inflation differential from both the long run and the dynamics. The results changed only very marginally.
To summarize this section, the individual-country dynamic estimates for the 1990s show that only two major industrial economies (Germany and Japan) with floating regimes vis-à-vis the U.S. fail to exhibit adjustment of their interest rates to the U.S.
interest rate. In this sense, only these two economies display clear evidence of monetary independence over the sample period.
With this exception, the country-specific estimates coincide with the pooled estimates in suggesting that over the 1990s all exchange regimes display full adjustment of domestic to international interest rates in the long run. Indeed, for some floatingregime developing countries and smaller industrial economies we find evidence of overadjustment -i.e., local rates move more than one-for-one with foreign rates.
The dynamic estimates also provide an idea of how long the long run is under each exchange rate regime -i.e., how long it takes for local interest rates to adjust to international rates. For developing-country hard pegs, the long run seems in fact quite short -these regimes exhibit the fastest adjustment of local interest rates among all regimes examined. At the other extreme, floating regimes seem to allow the longest transition period, both among developing and industrial countries. In this sense, our results seem to accord with the conventional wisdom that floating regimes provide increased room for temporary monetary independence.
25 Specifically, the main consequence of including inflation in the long run relation is to lower Mexico's long-run slope estimate from 24 to 4, and Chile's from 2.9 to 1.5. Excluding inflation from both the dynamics and the long-run equilibrium yields results very similar to those reported in the text.
Conclusions
In this paper we have tested whether the transmission of international interest rate changes to local rates is affected by the exchange rate regime. This is an important question in the context of the debate on the choice of currency regime, in which the issue of monetary independence has played a central role. Proponents of free-floating arrangements have argued that countries adopting floating regimes would be able to pursue their own monetary policy goals, while advocates of hard pegs have questioned the feasibility of such a strategy in a world of high international capital mobility.
The paper has taken a first step towards assessing empirically the relative merits of these two views, by reviewing the empirical regularities on international interest rate linkages for a large sample of industrial and developing countries. The approach taken here extends and generalizes earlier studies that have focused on a small group of countries over brief time periods. Specifically, the paper has examined the evidence from industrial and developing countries over the last three decades, using both pooled and single-country empirical estimates. The objective is to establish the main stylized facts that will need to be addressed in the debate on monetary independence and the choice of currency regime. To do this, we have employed simple reduced-form specifications relating domestic to world interest rates. In spite of their simplicity, the empirical models capture a considerable proportion of the variance in local interest rates, both across countries and over time.
The main results of the paper can be summarized in three points. First, over the last decade all exchange rate regimes exhibit high sensitivity of local interest rates to international ones. Indeed, in the 1990s we find virtually no instances of less-than-full Third, the only exception to these general results is provided by two large industrial countries (Germany and Japan), for which we find no evidence in the data of a long-run relation between local and international (U.S.) interest rates. Hence these countries appear to be the only ones that can, and choose, to benefit from independent monetary policy in the 1990s.
On the whole, these results are robust to changes in empirical specification and, in the case of the pooled estimates, to the use of alternative systems of classification of exchange regimes.
It is important to note one caveat of our analysis. To conclude, the empirical regularities identified in the paper leave many questions open for future research. We shall mention three. The first one concerns the interpretation of our finding of full transmission in the 1990s, in fixed and flexible regimes alike, except for large industrial economies. Does this mean that floating-regime countries are not able to pursue their independent monetary policy, or rather that they choose not to float, perhaps due to fear of floating?
More generally, we have not explored the channels through which international interest rates are transmitted to domestic rates -i.e., the relative roles of business cycle synchronization, common shocks, and policy decisions. Nor have we examined the impact of international rates on the country premium and the currency premium of local interest rates. These questions are left for future research.
Appendix: Exchange Rate Regime Classification
The starting point is the IMF's quarterly database on exchange rate regimes, which encompasses a total of 10 categories, based on officially reported exchange arrangements for the period 1975-1996.
We transform the IMF database to a monthly basis, complementing the original source with information contained in Cottarelli and Giannini (1997) . The table reports the coefficients and test of error correction models by country, which include the inflation rate in the dynamics. The main text describes the equation being estimated. The table reports the adjustment coefficient and the coefficient on the international interest rate from the long-run relation. Newey-West standard errors are in parenthesis. ** and * mean that the estimate is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance level respectively. ## means that the t-statistic rejects the null of no long-run relation at the 5 percent level regardless of the order of integration of the variables; # means that the rejection applies only to I(0) variables (see Pesaran, Shin, and Smith 2001) . The table reports the coefficients and test of error correction models by country, which include the inflation rate in the dynamics. The main text describes the equation being estimated. The table reports the adjustment coefficient and the coefficient on the international interest rate from the long-run relation. Newey-West standard errors are in parenthesis. ** and * mean that the estimate is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance level respectively. ## means that the t-statistic rejects the null of no long-run relation at the 5 percent level regardless of the order of integration of the variables; # means that the rejection applies only to I(0) variables (see Pesaran, Shin, and Smith 2001) . N/A means not applicable.
Adjustment coefficient
